Can Dignāga's Apoha Replace Real Universals？
Date：Apr 19, 2024
Venue：國立政治大學哲學系圖書室 (百年222)＋網路線上並行
Speaker：李承恩（國立政治大學哲學系博士生）
Type：佛教哲學研究生論壇
時間：4月19日（五） 下午4點~6點
地點：國立政治大學哲學系圖書室 (百年222）+ 網路線上並行（會議連結見報名表）
主持人：葉嘉雯（國立政治大學哲學系博士生）
演講人：李承恩（國立政治大學哲學系博士生）
評論人：何建興教授（中央研究院中國文哲研究所研究員）
演講摘要：The aim of this paper is to examine whether Dignāga’s nominalism could reasonably substitute the notion of apoha for real universals by fulfilling the primary characteristics of universals under Nyāya’s definition. Universals exist independently for Nyāya’s direct realism whereas, for Dignāga, universals are merely the exclusion (apoha) of others as mental constructions without ontological commitment. To undermine the realism of universals, Dignāga explicitly claims in PSV 5.36d that apoha itself is unitary, eternal and extends to the particulars in a certain class, thus it can be the ersatz universal. However, his assertion is defective. The paper argues that, inasmuch as apoha is the unreal object of conceptual cognition, it can be neither unitary nor permanent. In addition, I point out there should be a strong interpretation and a weak interpretation about the third feature of universals. From this analysis, apoha cannot satisfy either interpretation since a conceptual superimposition does not inhere in or qualify any real object. It is, therefore, impossible for the notion of apoha to fulfill any of three conditions of Nyāya’s real universals. To sum up, under Dignāga’s nominalist approach, the notion of apoha cannot justifiably replace real universals, which implies his failure to attack Nyāya.
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主辦單位：政大佛教哲學研究中心網站資訊：http://buddhica.nccu.edu.tw
聯絡信箱：nccucbp@gmail.com
贊助單位：佛教傳道協會 Bukkyo Dendo Kyokai