Can Dignāga's Apoha Replace Real Universals?

Date:Apr 19, 2024
Venue:國立政治大學哲學系圖書室 (百年222)+網路線上並行

時間:4月19日(五) 下午4點~6點

地點:國立政治大學哲學系圖書室 (百年222)+ 網路線上並行(會議連結見報名表)




演講摘要:The aim of this paper is to examine whether Dignāga’s nominalism could reasonably substitute the notion of apoha for real universals by fulfilling the primary characteristics of universals under Nyāya’s definition. Universals exist independently for Nyāya’s direct realism whereas, for Dignāga, universals are merely the exclusion (apoha) of others as mental constructions without ontological commitment. To undermine the realism of universals, Dignāga explicitly claims in PSV 5.36d that apoha itself is unitary, eternal and extends to the particulars in a certain class, thus it can be the ersatz universal. However, his assertion is defective. The paper argues that, inasmuch as apoha is the unreal object of conceptual cognition, it can be neither unitary nor permanent. In addition, I point out there should be a strong interpretation and a weak interpretation about the third feature of universals. From this analysis, apoha cannot satisfy either interpretation since a conceptual superimposition does not inhere in or qualify any real object. It is, therefore, impossible for the notion of apoha to fulfill any of three conditions of Nyāya’s real universals. To sum up, under Dignāga’s nominalist approach, the notion of apoha cannot justifiably replace real universals, which implies his failure to attack Nyāya.




贊助單位:佛教傳道協會 Bukkyo Dendo Kyokai